Terrorist Watch List Screening Overview

Overview

The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains the U.S. government's consolidated terrorist watch list, serving as a master repository for records of known or appropriately suspected international and domestic terrorists used for screening purposes across multiple agencies.

TSC Structure and Operations

Established September 2003 pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6)
Consolidates watch list records primarily from the National Counterterrorism Center, which compiles information on known or suspected international terrorists from executive branch departments and agencies
Receives domestic terrorist information from the FBI (e.g., Ted Kaczynski/Unabomber cases)
As of May 2007, contained approximately 755,000 records
Provides watch list records for various screening purposes including visa applications and airline passenger screening

Screening Process Flow

1. Frontline agencies conduct name-based searches against applicable terrorist watch list records when individuals: - Make airline reservations - Arrive at U.S. ports of entry - Apply for U.S. visas - Are stopped by state or local police within the United States 2. Computerized name-matching systems generate potential matches ("hits") 3. Obvious mismatches (negative matches) are resolved by the airline or agency if possible 4. Clearly positive, exact matches, and inconclusive matches are referred to TSC for confirmation 5. TSC refers positive and inconclusive matches to the FBI for counterterrorism response opportunities 6. Deciding actions involves collaboration among: - Frontline screening agencies - National Counterterrorism Center or other intelligence community members - FBI or other investigative agencies 7. If necessary, a member of an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force can respond in person to interview and obtain additional information about the person encountered 8. In other cases, the FBI relies on the screening agency and law enforcement agencies (such as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) to respond and collect information

Standards for Watch List Inclusion

National Counterterrorism Center and FBI rely upon standards of reasonableness in determining which individuals are appropriate for inclusion
Individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism—in addition to those with known links—are to be nominated
Inclusion on the list does not automatically prohibit an individual from obtaining a visa or entering the United States

Encounters and Outcomes (December 2003 - May 2007)

Agencies encountered individuals on the watch list approximately 53,000 times
Many individuals were encountered multiple times
Actions taken included:

- Arresting individuals - Denying others entry into the United States - Most often: questioning and releasing because there was not sufficient evidence of criminal or terrorist activity to warrant further legal action

Questioning allowed agencies to collect information on individuals, which was shared with law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community

Vulnerabilities in Screening Processes

Agencies do not check against all records in the consolidated watch list for several reasons:

- Checking against certain records may not be needed to support the respective agency's mission - Computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records may have limitations

Not checking against all records may pose a security risk
Some subjects of watch list records have passed undetected through agency screening processes and were not identified until after they had boarded and flown on an aircraft
Federal agencies have ongoing initiatives to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities

Strategic Gaps Identified (as of October 2007)

The federal government has made progress in using the consolidated watch list for screening purposes, but has not:

- Finalized guidelines for using watch list records within critical infrastructure components of the private sector - Identified all appropriate opportunities for which terrorist-related screening should be applied

Government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure—important elements for enhancing the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening

Recommendations to Promote Comprehensive Approach

1. Monitor and respond to vulnerabilities in agency screening processes 2. Establish up-to-date guidelines, strategies, and plans to facilitate expanded and enhanced use of the watch list 3. Finalize guidelines for using watch list records within critical infrastructure components of the private sector 4. Identify all appropriate opportunities for terrorist-related screening application 5. Develop an implementation plan with clearly defined leadership or governance structure

Legal Framework

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6): Established TSC in September 2003 to consolidate the government's approach to terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in screening processes
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11 (August 2004): Required Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with heads of appropriate federal departments and agencies, to submit two reports to the President:

- First report: Outline a strategy to enhance effectiveness of terrorist-related screening activities by developing comprehensive and coordinated procedures and capabilities - Second report: Provide a prioritized investment and implementation plan for detecting and interdicting suspected terrorists and terrorist activities, describing "scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of activities" to implement U.S. government's terrorism-related screening policies

GAO Report GAO-08-110 (October 2007): Provided detailed analysis of watch list management oversight, vulnerabilities in agency screening processes, and opportunities for expanded use

Oversight and Accountability

Homeland Security Council was provided a draft of the report but did not provide comments
Department of Homeland Security and FBI generally agreed with findings and recommendations (provided comments on draft)
GAO conducted work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards